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Introduction 
 
Sen (2000) suggests that there are three arguments in favour of democratic 
political freedoms and civil rights: their direct importance for basic capabilities, including 
that of political and social participation; their instrumental role in enhancing the hearing 
the people get, including their claim to economic needs; and their constructive role in the 
conceptualisation of the needs.  We suggest that the constructive role can be easily 
subverted by what we called the conspiracy of silence about issues, which are central to 
transforming the lives of the poor. The instrumental role of enhancing the hearing of 
people can also be effectively blunted if the hearing merely leads to populist rhetoric, and 
government spending plans to deliver services relevant to the poor, without actual 
delivery of quality services.  
 
Sen recognises that there is a danger of overselling the effectiveness of 
democracy. He notes that India’s success in eradicating famines is not matched by that in 
eliminating regular under-nutrition, or curing persistent illiteracy, or inequalities in 
gender relations. ‘While the plight of famine victims is easy to politicise, these other 
deprivations call for deeper analysis and more effective use of communication and 
political participation – in short fuller practice of democracy’ (p. 154). It is to this 
concern – the abiding problems of the ineffective delivery of basic social services 
(primary health care, reproductive health services, elementary schooling, safe drinking 
water and sanitary means of excreta disposal) and what governments need to do to trigger 
collective voice and local action - to which we turn our attention in this paper. It is this 
local action which, from the evidence, ensures effectiveness of service delivery.  
 
The first section makes three extensions to the Capability Approach, and explains 
why this extension is necessary in the context of ensuring better accountability of state-
delivered basic social services. The second section looks at the problem of why 
accountability is as weak as it is, and discusses it in the context of the nature of the 
colonial and post-colonial state. Section 3 moves on to examine the empirical evidence 
on the effectiveness of accountability through mechanisms of deep democratic 
decentralisation. In order to keep the discussion focused, we do this in the context of one 
basic service – that of ensuring schooling for all the children. However, the argument 
applies as much to the delivery of other basic services, and evidence is provided where 
available. A critical ingredient giving teeth to deep democratic decentralisation is the 
right to information, which is also discussed in this section. Section 4 examines the 
spread of decentralisation in the developed and developing world in the 1ast decade. The 
fifth section finds historical evidence from the now industrialised countries of the role of 
democracy and decentralisation in ensuring schooling for all in the 19
th century. 
 
1. Three extensions of the Capability Approach 
 
For Sen, a person’s ‘capability’ refers to the alternative combinations of 
functionings that are feasible for her to achieve. ‘Capability is thus a freedom’ (p. 75).   4
Functionings are things which a person may value doing or being – simple ones like 
being able to read and write, being well-nourished and being free from avoidable disease, 
or complex ones like being able to take part in the life of the community and having self-
respect. 
 
Our suggestion is that a group of simple functionings – being adequately 
nourished, being able to read and write, being free of avoidable disease - are 
synergistically linked to the more complex functionings in real life. For instance, the 
functionings (being educated up to elementary level) are very difficult to achieve without 
being able to participate in society. In the abstract, they are possible to realise separately, 
but in practice, it is often impossible for the poor to realise even simple functionings 
without the complex one of participation.
1 
 
Unless democracy permeates to the lowest level of the powerless poor, and is 
made effective by their collective action, even elementary functionings will be impossible 
to realise.
2 Democracy at the macro-level is what has always concerned Sen; the India 
versus China contrast is always referred to. Without democracy at the national level, 
micro-level democracy is inconceivable.
3 However, without the demand for effective 
services at the community level coming from ‘collective voice and collective action’, the 
supply of services will remain of poor quality and thus ineffective.  
 
We suggested above that simple functionings such as literacy and numeracy 
might be impossible to achieve without the complex one of being able to take part in the 
life of the community. The capability set must include the freedom, and in fact, the 
realised  functioning of participation. However, participation by who? The Capability 
Approach – as currently formulated – is so focused on the individual’s capabilities and 
functionings that it tends to ignore the powerlessness of the poor individual to realise 
those functionings, even if a distant government was willing and able to finance/provide 
services which are the basis of key functionings. In fact, an individual’s functioning of 
participation rarely amounts to more than voting in elections once in five years. A poor 
individual’s ability to participate more than once in five years is limited by her 
powerlessness. 
 
                                                           
1 The relationship holds in the opposite direction as well i.e. with the functionings of literacy and good 
health, individuals tend to become more effective “participants” in society.  That, however, is not the 
subject of this paper. 
2 After the Russian revolution (1917) and the Chinese revolution (1949) simple functionings improved for 
the vast majority of the peasant and working classes even in the absence of formal democracy in the 
Western sense. However, two points are fundamental here. First, even though formal democracy did not 
exist in either the Soviet Union or China, the voice of the poor was being articulated by the Bolsheviks (in 
whatever distorted form after the first decade) and by the Chinese Communist Party. Second, in the 21
st 
century, with the collapse of central planning and ‘democratic centralism’ of the Soviet variety, the way 
forward to articulate the voices of the poor has to be different from the Russian/Chinese authoritarian 
method – a subject beyond the scope of this paper. It has to be through deep democracy, which goes 
beyond multi-party elections in a Western democratic sense.  
3 For instance, it is unlikely that under a military regime (e.g. Pakistan 1999-2002) democratic 
decentralisation is going to make much headway, even though efforts at devolution (in Pakistan the efforts 
have been similar to those in India in the 1990s) are made.   5
Meanwhile, intermediaries exploit the distance between well-intentioned 
governmental action from the centre and the village where the school (or health centre) is 
located, to foil the objectives of the centre. In fact, without the state ‘enabling’ collective 
action, which emerges as a counterweight to the intermediaries, the delivery of services, 
and hence the functionings, cannot be realised. Sen rarely mentions the need for such 
collective action. Yet, only hierarchical control of functionaries is rarely effective under 
such circumstances. Since the poor have little choice of ‘exit’ (in the Hirschman (1970) 
sense), ‘voice’ alone works.  
 
So far, however, Sen’s discourse around the complex functioning of participation 
has been largely concerned with democracy at the national level (or state level in large 
federal states), multiparty politics and the role of the opposition in such democracy. 
Democracy at the macro level rarely translates into power for the poor. If it did, we 
would have more evidence of pro-poor economic growth and dramatic improvements in 
human development indicators in those Latin American, African and East European   
countries which went democratic over the 1980s and 1990s. After all, over a hundred 
countries now have democratically elected governments, almost twice as many as at the 
end of the 1980s (World Bank, 1999). The capability approach is essentially an 
evaluative one, and thus can be and has been used for normative purposes. If specific 
functionings (or their elements and concomitent indicators) are defined, then it is possible 
to measure the distribution of those functionings (or elements) in the population.
4  
However, the purpose there is largely evaluative.  An essential element in making the 
approach operational – in the sense of being helpful to the policy-maker – is to define the 
conditions that would lead to the realisation of the functionings.  We suggest that the 
complex functioning of participation has to be contextualised at the level of the 
community to have operational use.  Unless thus extended, none of the simple 
functionings are likely to be realised, even in democratic states. 
 
The state delivers development services in most developing countries in a top-down, 
bureaucratic manner through sectoral line ministries down to the local level. But this 
manner of service delivery defeats one of the greatest sources of technical efficiency in 
the utilisation of resources – the synergy of interventions in the various social sectors. 
Without the state making conscious effort to ensure synergy between interventions in the 
spheres of health, education, water and sanitation, reproductive health, and nutrition 
within a geographic location, these latent synergies will not be realised.
5 But the state is 
incapable of delivering these services effectively as long as it operates vertically. Inter-
sectoral action is best triggered through ‘voice’ at the local level, with village level 
planning. This synergy between interventions across sectors is likely to be an added 
benefit to the effective delivery of individual public services – if collective voice at the 
local level puts pressure on local-level functionaries to respond to local needs and 
                                                           
4 For instance, Brandolini and D’Alessio (1998) use such components like education and skills (with their 
typical indicator years of education, level of education reached), health and access to health care (indicator: 
contacts with doctors and nurses), and so no.  These are used in the Swedish Level of Living Surveys. 
5 For a detailed discussion of these synergies within basic services, and the synergies between basic 
services, income-poverty reduction and economic growth, see Mehrotra and Delamonica (OUP, 
forthcoming).   6
demands, instead of delivering services merely based on resource allocation determined 
at a higher, bureaucratic level of decision-making. 
 
To sum up this section, in our elaboration on the Capability Approach we would 
argue for three extensions in order to make the approach operational. First, we believe 
that Sen’s distinction between simple and complex functionings is too watertight; in real 
life, there is mutual interdependence between simple and complex functionings that Sen 
does not recognise. Second, Sen’s formulation of the Capability Approach focuses 
exclusively on the individual, ignoring the collective capability. Third, Sen’s articulation 
of democracy as a desirable condition for enhancing human capabilities is mistakenly 
conceived only at the national level, when what matters most for genuine participation is 
local participation, only realised through deep democratic decentralisation. To bring all 
three points together, we suggest that the complex functioning of participation the 
approach postulates needs to be contextualised at the level of the community – collective 
voice and collective action – to have operational use. Unless thus extended, none of the 
simple functionings (e.g. the ability to read and write) are likely to be realised, even in 
democratic states. 
 
 
2. Capability-enhancing accountability and the nature of the State 
 
Accountability is a top-down notion.  It assumes – rightly – that the government 
structure is a hierarchical one.  In a hierarchical bureaucracy, accountability usually 
implies answerability to higher echelons of government. At the highest level of 
government are presumably politicians, elected every five years or so, and hence only 
made accountable at quinquennial intervals.  Underlying the notion is an assumption that 
government functionaries deliver a service – inefficiently and corruptly – and if made 
‘accountable’ they will be more effective and less leakage of government funds would 
occur, and a higher fraction of government assistance would reach the people – rather 
than be ‘absorbed’ by the administration.  However, the notion of accountability is 
flawed because it posits the government as a ‘structure-in-itself’ and for-itself – distinct 
from the body of citizens who pay for its creation and, in democracies, voted them to 
power.  Without the citizenry’s quiescent sufferance there would be no structure-in-itself. 
 
Accountability of government functionaries which enhances the capabilities of its 
citizenry, we would suggest, is only possible when there is deep democratic centralisation 
of the state.  The current post-colonial state structure, however, is highly centralised, 
inherited from colonial administrations. The purpose of colonial administration was its 
own preservation, and the preservation of its status of distinctness and aloofness from the 
people they ruled.  The function of the colonial administration was to maintain law and 
order, and ensure a minimum level of infrastructure services in urban areas (where their 
functionaries usually lived) – e.g.water, electricity.  These functions were to be 
maintained so that the objective of surplus extraction for the metropole would continue 
smoothly and unhindered.  Meanwhile, the surplus extraction made it possible for the 
functionaries of the colonial state to enjoy a standard of living in the colony that was   7
roughly commensurate with that in their homeland – and much higher than that of the 
vast majority of the natives they ruled. 
 
The post-colonial state inherited the same functions but added on developmental 
ones to the hitherto minimal one associated with surplus extraction.  The developmental 
ones grew systematically over at least three decades from 1950 to 1980.  The provision of 
physical infrastructure grew to include the provision of a social infrastructure (health, 
education).  Not satisfied, it further involved the creation and the acquisition of 
productive facilities and services (banking, insurance, and trade).  The monopolies and 
public sector enterprises created by this expansion of developmental activities also 
created a fertile ground for rent-seeking by politicians, bureaucrats and lower level 
functionaries.  The scope for rent-seeking grew so much as to make it plausible to argue 
that the state by the late 1970s had turned predatory, while still being developmental.
6  
Surplus extraction by the post-colonial state was now no more for an external 
government – be it based in Paris, London, Lisbon, Madrid, Amsterdam, Tokyo or Rome 
– but rapid economic growth - compared to economic stagnation in colonial times - 
enabled rent-seeking to thrive. 
 
This is hardly surprising given that the structure-in-itself of the post-colonial state 
was merely superimposed on the existing colonial state structure.  The existence of 
democracy might have replaced the hitherto authoritarian state – a certain plus.  But the 
structure’s separation from its citizenry survived. 
 
What changed dramatically was the nature of the personnel in 
bureaucratic/political leadership.  The colonial bureaucrat had relatively little reason to be 
a rent-seeker at a personal level; his primary objective was to facilitate surplus extraction 
for the metropole.  But very soon comparisons were being made among the post-colonial 
citizenry between the moral uprightness of the colonial administrators, and their post-
colonial successors.  The colonial administrators could afford to be morally upright even 
in the absence of democracy, let alone deep democratic decentralization and 
accountability to the people.  The political role of the colonial state was surplus 
extraction, not personal enrichment.  When the senior-most administrators were known to 
be upright, there was little scope for middle and lower level state functionaries to be 
engaged in personal aggrandissement.  But the post-colonial state’s rapidly expanding 
developmental role and the growth in the state’s fiscal base created the scope for 
government leaders – both in the legislative as well as the executive branches – to engage 
in personal enrichment. 
 
Democratic elections provided the environment for a vicious cycle to be set in 
motion.  Electioneering required finances, and since candidates were not funded by the 
state, the mobilization of funds for fighting and winning elections created a fertile ground 
for industrial groups and/or landed interests to finance political parties.  Electioneering 
                                                           
6 This story largely applies to much of South Asia as well as to Sub-Saharan Africa, naturally with certain 
variations on this broad theme (on South Asia, see Bardhan, 1984; Wade, 1985,1989; on Sub-Saharan 
Africa, see Tendler, ). The story is more complicated in much of East Asia (on the latter, see Khan, 2001) 
and Latin America (see Amis,  ).   8
became an increasingly expensive business.  Once funds were raised and spent, debts 
were incurred – both moral and financial.  If military juntas overthrew democratically 
elected governments (in any case flawed elections) they inherited the rent-seeking from 
their civilian predecessors. Those debts had to be re-paid – by raising more money. 
Mechanisms emerged to mobilize resources both through legal (e.g. taxes) or illegal 
means and distribute those resources legally (e.g. through subsides) or illegally (through 
patronage). So the making of appointments in the police, the education system, the 
publicly owned utility companies became a ‘business”.  Appointments, transfers, 
promotions all could be bought and sold for a price.  Once a bureaucratic post had been 
‘bought’ in a purely financial transaction, the out-of-pocket costs by the candidate 
appointed had to be fully recouped; and thereafter profits made – the citizenry was the 
final source of funds.  Most payments were made from unaccounted-for sources – 
creating  a fertile ground for the spreading of the black economy. 
                     
An aspect of the authoritarian corruption-free colonial state was its monopoly of 
information.  The Official Secrets Act was the means for withholding sensitive 
information which, in the eyes of the colonial state, could be used by the nationalist 
leaders – struggling for political freedom and independence from the colonizers – against 
the state. The same Official Secrets Act has, however, continued to exist in the post-
colonial period, despite the introduction of democratic five-yearly elections to nascent 
legislatures and parliaments after independence.  Unless Official Secrets Act are replaced 
by legislation giving citizens the right to information, the voice of the people cannot be 
articulated.  ‘Voice’ is based on information, and as long as information (and state 
documents containing information) are the monopoly of state functionaries, the latter can 
continue to act with impunity in the secure knowledge that the higher echelons – 
themselves corrupt – will protect them.  In fact, if the higher-ups in the hierarchy do not 
protect the ones lower down – the ones who have the most dealings with the public – the 
game would be over. 
 
What is needed is a state that is genuinely ‘embedded’ in the larger society 
(instead of being separate from it), and which has a relationship of reciprocity and mutual 
interdependence.  That kind of state will not be a structure in-itself and for-itself.  For 
only when it ceases to be such that the notion of ‘accountability’ would become 
redundant.  It is not as though the state is not currently ‘accountable’. To a whole series 
of networks (the capitalist, the landed, the labour aristocracy) the two key sets of 
personnel – bureaucrats and politicians – are to some extent already accountable.  So the 
structure-in-itself is indeed embedded in networks in society.  But the kind of 
accountability we are talking about is that at the community level of the lowest-level 
functionaries of the state – both elected functionaries (i.e. politicians) as well as civil 
servants (e.g. nurse/mid-wife, school teacher, water engineer).  Without that 
accountability, services cannot be delivered effectively.  Without that accountability, nor 
can the synergy of interventions in health, education, nutrition and water and sanitation 
be realised. 
 
The international financial institutions launched their neo-liberal ‘roll-back the 
state’ campaign after the fiscal deficits of overly stretched developmental states grew to   9
unmanageable levels.  The IFIs have attempted to cut the state’s functions right down to a 
similar (though not same) level as that of the colonial state.  Underlying this neo-liberal 
notion of the minimalist state is a notion of market failure – the state should only 
intervene where there is likely to be market failure (e.g. basic health, basic education, and 
infrastructure).  This notion of the state is keenly informed by the literature on 
government failure.  Government failure, in this view, had characterized the pre-1980 
state in most developing societies in both its taking on functions in the productive/service 
sectors of the economy, and in not undertaking the required regularly functions in an 
even-handed manner (which could have enabled capital accumulation to occur in the 
private sector).  However, state structures which were inherited from the colonial state - 
created for entirely different objectives - were bound to suffer from ‘government failure’.  
The mere imposition of Westminster-style parliaments in new states was not going to 
transform structures meant for surplus-extraction and law-and-order maintenance into 
democratic forms of functioning – least of all in largely illiterate societies. 
 
3.  Making deep democratic decentralisation work 
 
Moves towards democratic decentralisation in India 
 
  At least in India there has been a recognition that central planning of the kind for 
which the national Planning Commission is responsible has not worked. This recognition 
has led to the constitutional amendment to create district-and-below elected bodies that 
can engage in micro-planning. The Plannning Commission recognises a district (in India 
usually a district has a population of 2 million) as the lowest unit of planning in all 
sectoral plans including education. The 1993 constitutional amendments (73
rd and 74
th) 
gave a statutory basis to district planning by providing for the constitution of a  District 
Planning Committee to consolidate the plans prepared by village panchayats (elected 
councils of at least five persons from the village) and town municipalities and to prepare 
a draft development plan for the district as a whole. This is clearly a welcome 
development, but the process runs the risk of replicating the ‘top-downness’ of planning 
of an earlier era. To deepen the process what is needed is collective voice, to enable 
collection action by the community at the lowest level – thus creating a synergy with the 
district-level planning process. This is what we mean by deep democratic 
decentralisation. What is required is a way for micro-level planning at the community 
level to articulate with and directly influence the outcomes of macro-planning at the 
district level. 
 
  The 1993 Constitutional Amendment (72
nd and 73
rd), mandated the creation of 
elected councils in every state at and below the district level – known as the panchayati 
raj institutions (PRI).
7 Empowering the PRIs to play the designated role clearly means a 
different role for the bureaucracy and other political interests. Whereas the National 
Policy on Education (1986) had created the District Boards of Education, now with the 
election of the PRIs (after 1993), the government’s democratic decentralisation went a 
                                                           
7 Each state is divided into administrative units called districts, which are further divided into blocks, which 
in turn are comprised of a number of villages. The elected councils – which had existed in the 1950s and 
had become moribund – have been made mandatory at each of the 3 administrative levels.   10
step further: Village Education Committees and Panchayat Committee on Education at 
the block level (in addition to the District Board) were set up. 
 
Clearly institutions will not grow immediately into their full potential and start 
performing, unless they are nurtured, supported, with adequate funds and powers to 
perform their functions. Only a positive partnership between the PRIs and state 
governments will ensure that the tasks of school effectiveness, and other local 
development challenges, will be confronted.
8 
 
The involvement of PRIs in education since 1994 when they were constituted has 
been uneven across states. The high-achiever state Kerala – which already had high 
education and health indicators before PRIs became widespread – has moved vigorously 
in making  PRIs central to development planning, including education.
9 Similarly, 
Madhya Pradesh – which we discuss in detail later – has attempted to give them a central 
place, while other states have shown varying responses. In West Bengal – with a 
Communist Party government in power for over 20 years and where PRIs functioned, 
unlike the rest of India, even before the 1993 Amendments – education has been 
organised under the nominated district primary education councils for many years. 
Instead of constituting a body from elected representatives, the state government 
continues with the nominated councils (Raina, 2000). Similar parallel systems, of village 
and other committees exist under many other educational programmes and projects in 
other states, sometimes producing a bewildering situation at the grassroots level. In fact, 
when other sectors are taken into account, such bodies have probably grown even more in 
all states. In other words, while the constitutional measure – an enabling action – to 
mandate the creation of PRIs was taken by the central parliament, it is the follow-up by 
the state governments to empower the PRIs that will result in effective ‘voice’ becoming 
possible. What we will show is that where that ‘voice’ has been made effective, the 
results are impressive. 
 
We demonstrate this with the example of two states in India which have been 
known to be under-achievers in primary schooling and literacy.  These two states – 
Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan – have made remarkable progress in the decade between 
Census 1991 and Census 2001.  How voice has played a role in this development is 
discussed below.  But in order to place in perspective the achievement of these two states, 
a few remarks on the state of schooling in much of the educationally backward states – 
which is reminiscent of much of South Asia or Sub-Saharan Africa – is discussed. 
 
  
Elementary schools: cake for the rich, fodder for the poor 
 
India has the largest populations of illiterates in the world, the illiterate population in year 
2000 being larger than its total population was at the time of independence from British 
rule, over half a century ago (1947). Yet, at the same time, today 750 firms in the Silicon 
                                                           
8 For an analysis of the unevenness of the powers vested with PRIs in different states, see a World Bank 
document: Overview of Rural Decentralisation in India, New Delhi, September, 2000. 
9 For a discussion of Kerala, see Sen (1989), and Krishnan (1997).   11
Valley, California were started and are owned by Indians; 36 per cent of Microsoft staff 
are Indians; India exploded its first nuclear device in 1974 largely based on indigenously 
developed technology. How does this situation come about? How do such apparently 
contradictory phenomena coexist in one country? 
 
In federal India, spending on education is a prerogative, according to the 
Constitution of India, of the state (i.e. provincial) governments; 85 per cent of all public 
education expenditure in India is undertaken by the state governments.  The remainder is 
the responsibility of the central government. On average, under 50 per cent of state 
expenditure on education has gone to elementary education (grades 1-8) through much of 
independent India’s history; contrast that to 68 per cent going to primary (grades 1-5) in 
South Korea in the early 1950s onwards. The central government has, simultaneously, 
financed the creation of elite institutes of technology, institutes of management, and so 
on, which provide world class education, where entry has been highly restricted through 
national competition, and even more interestingly, where education was until recently 
nearly free. Those capable of entering these elite institutions of higher education come 
exclusively from fee-paying private elementary schools, where the medium of instruction 
is English. Public schooling, provided mostly by state governments, has not succeeded in 
50 years since independence in providing universal access  to schooling, so that net 
enrolment at primary level in the country is only 82 per cent. In addition, public schools 
are of such low quality that a third of children enrolled are known to drop out. 
 
  Significant proportions of primary schools (grades 1-5) - often with a minimum of 
150 children - have only one or two teachers; hence, multi-grade teaching is a matter of 
necessity. Teachers are well paid, but with little peer pressure, teacher absenteeism is a 
widespread problem.
10  Knowledge of subject content of most teachers is questionable. 
All the evidence from learning achievement tests is that minimum levels of learning in 
language and math are not achieved by a majority of children. 
 
Democratic decentralisation to realise schooling for all – the case of Madhya Pradesh 
 
  It is not sufficient for the State to merely take enabling action to create 
democratic institutions at the local level – as it has done for all states in the country. For 
collective voice to be enabled, and to translate into collective action by the community, 
state governments have to empower PRIs, as the state government of Madhya Pradesh 
(henceforth MP) has done.  MP is one of the six states in India (Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, MP, 
Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal) which account for two-thirds of the 
children out of school.
11 In other words, it is one of the states where the literacy rate has 
been well below the national average, along with the other states mentioned. However, in 
the 2001 Census of India (a decennial event), MP showed an increase of 20 percentage 
points in its literacy rate, the highest increase of any state (along with Rajasthan) during 
                                                           
10 Teacher absenteeism is a widespread problem in other South Asian Countries and over much of Sub-
Saharan Africa.  Schools cannot function if teachers often have second jobs. 
11 These are the also the states chosen by Unicef to study the problem of financing of basic education, along 
with Assam and a relative high-achiever, Tamil Nadu. See Mehrotra et al (forthcoming).   12
the period 1991-2001. Clearly, the MP government was doing several things right. What 
were they? 
 
  MP was the first state to put the PRI system into effect (after the constitutional 
amendment was passed by the Indian parliament in 1993). In contrast, Bihar (which has 
had the worst educational and social indicators in the country, comparable to those in 
much of Sub-Saharan Africa) was the only state, which had not had its PRI elections until 
2001. A working PRI system was in place in MP in 1994. It provided a facilitating 
structure for direct community action. The government converted selected programmes, 
of which primary education was one, into a mission-mode. Instead of academic 
institutions conducting a sample survey, this democratic decentralisation opened an 
opportunity to undertake a door-to-door survey through elected people’s representatives 
to discover the names of children in and out of school.  
 
Ironically, this survey was carried out as part of the DPEP programme
12 -  which 
drives the point home about the difference between taking enabling action by the state, 
and empowering the community. While most states in India took the enabling action of 
creating the PRI system, none took as much empowering action as Kerala
13 and MP. 
What makes a difference is not merely voice through Village Education Committees – 
which exist, at least nominally in all states, but which functioned unevenly – but actual 
involvement of parents and mobilising the interest and enthusiasm of the local 
community. 
 
The panchayat leadership was seen by the MP state government as key players. 
There were three differences. First, instead of using the school teacher for data collection, 
the responsibility was widened to a local group including the local panchayat 
representatives and literacy activists. Second, the idea was not just to collect information 
of which children were in school (from school statistics), but which children (5-14 year 
olds) from the village were not in school. Third, the objective in surveying children was 
not one of statistics collection but to lead the motivational campaign to persuade parents 
to send their children to school (Gopalakrishnan and Sharma, 1999). It was, in other 
                                                           
12 The District Primary Education Programme (DPEP) has been run on a decentralised and participatory 
basis, but with many of the top-down elements being retained (see Bashir and Ayyar, 2001). MP also had 
the largest number of districts covered by DPEP of all Indian states, and hence received a considerable 
proportion of total DPEP funds disbursed by the central government. 
13 Kerala – already in the mid-1990s a high-achiever in health and education indicators – has implemented 
a real programme for peoples’ participation in the wake of the action to decentralise governance through 
the PRI. Under the People’s Development Planning process in Kerala, each village council (or Panchayat) 
has made its own Ninth Five-Year Plan (1997-2002). In fact, it also took the unprecedented decision to 
make available 40 per cent of the Ninth Plan funds directly to panchayats for the implementation of these 
plans, which include education. Often state governments make a policy statement regarding the powers of 
the panchayat, but administrative rules and procedures that determine actual practice by the bureaucracy are 
left untouched. In Kerala, however, an exhaustive study was conducted of the existing administrative laws 
that need to be changed so that the rules and procedure allow panchayats to exercise their powers without 
conflict with other authorities.
13 The study identified over a thousand rules that require amendment. More 
recently, Madhya Pradesh state government has been doing the same. 
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words, intended to consolidate community management of the primary education system 
in the state.
14  
 
A remarkable conclusion – with significant policy implications – emerged from 
the participatory survey. It is well known that government school-based statistics of 
enrolment are grossly exaggerated, showing inflated enrolment. In fact, the implication of 
the high government school-reported enrolment statistics is that those children not in 
school are in fact drop-outs; no wonder the drop-out rate seems so appallingly high in 
most states (at least based on government data). However, most ‘out of school’ children 
contacted through the survey described themselves as ‘unenroled’ and not ‘dropped out’. 
The policy implication is that, in addition to the problem of dropout (which, though not 
non-existent, may be much smaller than believed hitherto), the major problem is that 
children have never gone to school.  
 
In other words, access to schools itself is a problem – despite the government 
claiming that the norm of provision of one school within a one kilometre distance has 
been met for 95 per cent of India’s children. It also knocks the bottom out of the massive 
central governmental effort – with significant budgetary allocations – to provide Non-
formal Education (NFE centres) to the millions of dropouts around the country since 
1979. If children never went to school, how could they drop-out; and if they never 
dropped-out, then why provide NFE centres for them? What is needed is formal primary 
schools for them!
15 
 
The policy response of the state was to introduce a scheme to guarantee primary 
schools to all hamlets – not just all villages (given that a village consists of a number of 
discrete hamlets). Under the scheme (called the Education Guarantee Scheme), if forty 
parents in a locality (only 25 in a tribal area) seek a school for their children, routed 
through the village panchayat, the state government is committed to provide, within 90 
days, a lower-paid teacher’s salary for the purpose.
16 The village panchayat  can appoint 
                                                           
14 One outcome of the survey was the development of a Village Education Register as a basic record of 
educational statistics of each village to be maintained in two copies at the village panchayat and the school. 
The survey was also used as a basis of cohort monitoring for completion of primary schooling. 
15 Concerned about the so-called high dropout rate in the country despite growing enrolment 
through the first three decades after independence, the central government in 1978 started a country-wide 
programme for creating NFE centres, both in villages without a government primary school as well as those 
with one. They were supposed to mop-up the children who had dropped out, enabling them through 2-3 
hours a teaching a day to reenter the formal primary school. However, the NFE centres have had not little 
or no impact in increasing enrolment in MP (and elsewhere). Data (collected during the campaign-based 
survey in MP suggest that enrolments and droput rates in villages with  NFE  centres  remain  the  same  or 
higher than those without them. In fact the share of children out-of-school in villages where there is only a 
NFE centre is hgiher than those with only primary school. In other words, despite their much lauded 
operational flexibility, the NFE centres have not been more successful in enrolling children than the formal 
primary schools with their more rigid timetable and structure. Worse, more girls are out of school in 
villages with NFE centres than in villages with a primary school, so that even in respect of special 
targetting of girls (under the central government scheme, 90 per cent central assistance goes to girls’-only 
NFE centres) the NFE scheme is a disaster (Sharma and Gopalakrishnan, 1999). 
 
16 One of the main reasons for the success of the EGS is its cost-effectiveness.  In regular (non EGS) 
schools, teacher salaries account for over 90 per cent of costs at the primary level.  School teachers in   14
the teacher from within the community, and it has also to make arrangements for space 
where the children can organise the children into classes.  
 
The results have been remarkable. While 80,000 schools had opened in the fifty 
years since independence in MP as part of the regular government primary school system, 
30 000 new schools were created within three years of the schemes announcement (after 
January 1997). What is particularly important is that it led to a huge increase in enrolment 
of tribal children – the very children who had among the lowest enrolment rates among 
vulnerable groups. It also led to a larger than proportionate increase in girls’ enrolment. 
 
Several features of the scheme have to be noted, and offer profound lessons for 
other similar situations around the world. First, the scheme offers a guarantee from the 
state to provide a school on demand from the community, but a guarantee that is not 
legal. This is of interest to those who have argued vociferously for making primary 
education compulsory by law. In India, there has been an ongoing political battle over a 
parliamentary bill, which proposes to make access to elementary education a fundamental 
right of every citizen, thus making it mandatory for the state to provide it, and also 
making the right justiciable in a court of law.
17 In fact, as Sharma and Gopalakrishnan 
(1999) argue, the enforcement of legal provisions could create more legal action than 
education, diverting resources towards litigation rather than educational investments. 
 
Second, the expansion of schools and enrolment is the outcome of a mutually 
dependent action by the government and the community. The community’s demand for a 
school (‘collective voice’) is the initial premise of government action.
18 Even the 
provision of a school is a reciprocal action with the community recommending the 
teacher from among its local people and the government remunerating and training her, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
regular schools are strongly unionised and an important political force, and receive salaries which are high 
relative to per capita income (Mehrotra, 2001; Kingdon, 1994).  However, EGS schools teachers are paid 
only a third or less of what regular school-teachers are paid. 
17 Wiener (1991) argued that in order to reduce child labour in India it is essential to make primary 
education compulsory in India, just as it was done in many European countries in the 19
th century. 
However, in India state governments are permitted to legislate that elementary education is compulsory, 
and many have done so. There is no evidence to suggest that the states that have compulsory elementary 
education have any better educational indicators than those which have not. In fact, the international 
evidence points to exactly the same evidence. See Mehrotra (1998). 
18 The community’s agency in EGS is critical to its success. This is best illustrated in contrast to another 
national scheme, in this case of the central government, the NFE (mentioned above) now finally abandoned 
by the government in 2000 after 21 years on account of its being almost entirely dysfunctional.The 
proposal for a new NFE centre came from the state government’s education department, and after the 
government’s approval, the district panchayat issued the order. The demand did not come from the village 
panchayat. The assessment of materials needed in the NFE centre was by the education department and he 
passed this information on to the district panchayat. The role of the panchayats was confined to ratifying 
official proposals, looking upwards for further sanctions. In contrast, EGS vests the budget with the village 
panchayat, and then extends the responsibility laterally towards the community.The dysfunctionality of the 
NFE is symptomatic of the ineffectiveness of the entire system of basic education.  The fact that it took 21 
years for the government to finally abandon the scheme is a telling example of the pitfalls of the 
bureaucratic path to development. 
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the community providing space for the centre, the government providing educational and 
other contingency materials. 
 
Third, the fact that the teacher comes from the community ensures two things: 
accountability of the teacher to the community, and of the community as parents to the 
teacher. Above all, it addresses the endemic problem – underlying the ineffectiveness of 
schools – of teacher absenteeism. One of the perennial bane of the rural school in India 
generally, and in the northern states in particular, is teacher absenteeism, together with 
the problem of arriving late to school and leaving early. The teacher can get away with 
such behaviour when he does not belong to the community, and is only accountable to a 
distant inspector of schools belonging to the government’s department of education. If he 
is accountable to the panchayat, monitoring becomes so much easier. 
 
Sen has always spoken of the agency role of women in the development process – 
justifiably so. The constitutional amendment to revive the PRIs requires that at least one-
third of the members of the village council are to be women. So far women have tended 
to play a minor role, even in the village council, being seen as proxies for their husbands. 
The fact that many of these women may be illiterate does not strengthen their position. 
Over time, however, it is possible that they will mature into more active agents – 
especially as active members of parent-teacher organisations and village education 
committees. 
 
Sen rarely speaks of the community and its agency role.  However, the real 
difference in the case of the campaign mode of data collection by the panchayat 
leadership is precisely the agency role being played by the community. Collection of 
education data as done at present is indicative of the centralised nature of governance and 
its management of primary education. When accountability structures function in a 
centralised system of governance, they work vertically upwards towards the higher 
echelons of the bureaucracy, and never horizontally towards the community.  
 
Schooling:  The synergy of collective voice and state action in Rajasthan 
 
  Like MP, another state that made remarkable strides during the 1990s is the north-
western state of Rajasthan. Literacy rates between Census 1991 and Census 2001 rose by 
as much as 21 percentage points (from to 41 to 62 per cent), slightly higher than MP. 
This is again remarkable because like MP, Rajasthan is known to be a backward state in 
respect of every human development indicator. Now the only two states that continue to 
live upto their BIMARU (or sick) status in respect of schooling are Uttar Pradesh (with a 
population the size of Russia or Brazil) and of course, Bihar.  
 
  The processes that led to this heart-warming achievement in Rajasthan are rather 
similar to those in MP. What started as projects – Shiksha Karmi in 1987 and Lok 
Jumbish in 1992 – became state-wide processes. Both these projects began before the 
creation of the PRIs down to the village level. In other words, unlike in MP, where the 
process began well after the creation of PRIs (constitutional amendment of 1993), in 
Rajasthan the process began earlier but has been deepened by the PRIs. First, as in MP,   16
school-mapping carried out with full community participation is a feature. It was adopted 
as a means of offsetting the weaknesses of central planning which for over four decades 
failed to ensure universal access to schooling. The state has a difficult topography, with 
large parts of it being a desert. In fact, what school-mapping does is to substitute macro-
planning by a central body located in the state capital by micro-planning by the affected 
community itself. It not only identifies the children out of school – as opposed to 
counting those in school as is done in the administrative recording system with highly 
inaccurate and usually inflated enrolment rates – but it also ensured community 
mobilisation. In other words, it goes beyond the traditional approach to school mapping, 
which approaches it as simply as an exercise in locating schools based on quantitative 
criteria (Singh, 2000). Instead, it is a means of generating demand for schooling in 
communities where the vast majority of parents are illiterate, and hence it is not taken for 
granted in such households that the child will necessarily go to school when attaining 
school-going age. In such a situation, only participatory diagnosis of the problem, 
analysis and then mobilisation can lead to schooling becoming a people’s movement for 
schooling (Ramchandran, 1998; Ramchandran and Sethi, 2001). 
 
  The government encourages the creation of a core team responsible for school 
mapping. The attempt is to ensure that each core team has at least 50 per cent women 
members. A lynchpin of the core team is the shiksha karmi or locally recruited school 
teacher (unlike the majority of schools in India where teachers are appointed by the state 
administration to a civil service to transferable teaching posts within the state). Women’s 
groups are also formed to strengthen the core team. A family to family survey about child 
participation in schooling is followed by the preparation of a Village Education Register. 
The latter provides the basis to plan enrolment of children in schools. The register 
pertains to each family in the village, so that their participation in schooling can be 
monitored. Regular attendance is encouraged through persuasion by the core team or the 
Village Education Committee. 
 
  The Village Education Register, Retention Register and Village Education Plan 
are seen as peoples’ documents which are not kept in government custody. This allows 
the community to have complete access to these, unlike land records. This is an important 
issue, and we return later to discuss the people’s Right to Information. 
 
  The Village Education Committees are critical to the programme. Members to the 
VEC are selected in the village council. Village-level bodies have been known in the past 
to be dominated by the power-elite (usually landed, upper-caste, men); hence they are 
required by the government to give representation to all hamlets part of the village, most 
castes, women and even parents of children not of school-going age. The VEC performs a 
whole series of functions, described in Box 1. 
 
 
 
 
Box 1.  Functions of Village Education Committee 
i)  Participation in household survey and school mapping.   17
ii)  Enrolment of all children in 6-14 years age group from their locality or 
habitation. 
iii)  Taking decisions in regard to location and timings of schools. 
iv)  Monitoring participation of children in day schools to ensure that children do 
not remain absent and if they do, using their influence to get them back to 
school. 
v)  Ensuring availability of textbooks and teaching – learning materials with all 
children, especially those belonging to poorer sections of society. 
vi)  Making regular visits to schools to ensure their regular functioning. 
vii)  Obtaining contributions in cash and kind from the community to improve the 
physical infrastructure and environment of the local school. 
viii)  Assisting in organization of national day celebrations, sports tournaments and 
extracurricular activities. 
ix)  Advising and motivating teachers, also bringing lack of performance to the 
notice of higher authorities. 
Source: Singh (2000). 
 
This is a programme essentially to provide access to schooling by ensuring the 
creation of a school in school-less communities or by making an existent but 
dysfunctional school function again. This requires the hiring of two locally available 
teachers to substitute for the regular primary school teacher who is frequently absent. It 
also requires opening of new schools in school-less habitations. 
 
It is important to emphasise that this programme is not run by an NGO. It is 
implemented by a board, an autonomous agency under the control of the state education 
minister. After the setting up of the elected panchayat structure it has developed links 
with elected representatives at different levels. 
 
What the experience of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh demonstrates that in two 
of the most low-income of Indian states, with the worst social indicators in the country, it 
is possible to bring about a transformation in schooling for the poor – provided the local 
government functionaries are mobilised in a participatory manner, and government 
structures are made to respond to collective pressure from the people.  
 
Health:  accountability to the community in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Mobilising voice in the health sector has also helped to rejuvenate health services. 
For instance, serious disruption to public health systems occurred during the 1980s in 
most Sub-Saharan countries, when a severe international economic recession and 
financial indebtedness led to structural adjustment measures in many countries and a 
marked reduction in the state’s role in the provision of services (Chabot et al, 1995). One 
approach to this crisis lay in the greater mobilisation of community resources in the 
development of local health services, recognising that patients seeking care were already 
beginning to pay considerable sums of money for treatment of various kinds. This was 
the situation in which the Bamako Initiative arose in 1987 – leading in many countries to   18
a reasonably successful example of voice in ensuring access to affordable essential health 
services for an increasing proportion of people (Jarrett and Ofusu Amaah, 1992). 
 
The Bamako Initiative, implemented to varying degrees in half the countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and fewer countries in Latin America and Asia since the late 1980s, 
has shown that organised communities can help sustain local public health services, not 
only by contributing financial resources, but by having ‘voice’ in the management of 
services. The strategy of the BI is to revitalise public health systems by decentralising 
decision-making from the national to the district level, instituting community financing 
and co-management of a minimum package of essential services at the level of the basic 
health units. The aim is to improve services by generating sufficient income to cover 
some local operating costs such as the essential drug supply, salaries of some support 
staff, and incentives for health workers. Funds generated by community financing do not 
revert to the central treasury but remain in the community and are controlled by it 
through a locally elected health committee. From mere recipients of health care, 
consumers become active partners whose voices count. 
 
  After ten years of implementation of the Initiative, community action in most 
rural health centres in Benin and Guinea has not only enabled nearly half the population 
to be regular users of the services, but has also raised and sustained immunization levels 
close to Year 2000 Health for All target levels (Levy-Bruhl et.al., 1997).  Charging a 
modest fee to users is seen in some cases to be the most affordable option for the poorest 
segments of the population who otherwise have to access more expensive alternatives, 
although it is less clear whether mechanisms exist to protect indigent members of the 
community.  Much of the success has been in ensuring the supply of affordable essential 
drugs that are readily available in the health centres, under the scrutiny of the committees.  
Another factor has been the improved attitude of health workers, traditionally one reason 
for people, especially women, not to use the service. 
 
Recent assessments have shown that community participation in the Bamako 
Initiative has actually not been as well-defined as originally thought, and that significant 
community empowerment has not taken place.  ‘Induced’ participation, pushed in many 
cases by donor demand and often based on political decisions or bureaucratic 
simplicities, tends to accentuate elite groups in communities, marginalizing women and 
the spontaneous organizations that are already formed to cope collectively with local 
problems. 
 
However, even with a relatively weak voice exercised by households and 
communities, significant outcomes have been achieved.  It would appear that voice needs 
to be associated with the retention and use locally of locally-generated resources and that 
these go to improving the health service and achieving sustained outcomes.  Greater 
emphasis, however, needs to put on working with existing local organizations and 
motivating their participation in the running of services. 
 
  To close this discussion of local organisations:  in a classic study of 150 local 
organisations from developing countries, Esman and Uphoff (1984) gave scores for rural   19
development performance. It was found that local organisations were the most successful 
with the highest scores when the organisation was started by local leaders. The scores 
were lowest when the initiation was by government.
19 But when outside agencies, either 
government or NGOs, focused their efforts on building local capacity rather than creating 
local organisation to implement external programmes, the scores were nearly as high 
when local organisation were started by local leaders.  
 
The Right to Information – the steel-frame of deep democratic decentralisation 
 
  If deep democratic decentralisation is to succeed, it can only do so armed with the 
Right to Information – and the abolition of the Official Secrets Act. At least in all South 
Asian countries the Official Secrets Act was operative in almost every country under 
British colonial rule. Laws to promote secrecy instituted by the British to suit their own 
agenda of preserving a authoritarian regime, intended for surplus extraction, have been 
adopted by post-colonial states to promote vested political interests. 
 
  The right to information is recognised in the UN Declaration of Human Rights, 
1948. Article 19 of the declaration says: ‘ Everyone has the right to freedom or opinion 
and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers’. Sweden was one of the first countries with laws providing freedom of 
information. Similarly the right to information is also recognised in laws passed in 
Finland, Norway, Denmark, Canada, Australia and the US. Thus in Sweden in each 
department all incoming and outgoing mail are out in a special press room for an hour 
every morning for reporters to examine. If any reporter wants further information on  a 
case, she only needs to walk down the hall to examine the department’s files (Sachar, 
1999). 
 
  The first problem is that in most low-income countries the right to information 
has not been recognised in law. In India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka civil society actors have 
succeeded in the past few years to provide government with a blueprint for right to 
information legislation. In Pakistan, the draft ordinance was passed in a highly watered 
down form by the caretaker Leghari government in the mid-1990s and then allowed to 
lapse by the new government. The ordinance suggested by civil society groups failed on 
account of bureaucratic resistance since it gave broad access to bureaucratic decisions, 
including questions of loans and exposed loan defaulters. Nepal has the right to 
information guaranteed as a fundamental right in the Constitution but it has not been used 
much on account of the ignorance of people about their rights. In India three states (Tamil 
Nadu, Goa) have passed laws on the right to information while others have tried to 
enforce it in some form through executive instructions and guidelines. 
 
                                                           
19 Some similar arguments emerge if the cooperative movement is examined. In India, cooperatives have 
become parastatals. They have had an overdose of state patronage and nearly absolute control by the 
Registrar. A cooperative is supposed to have voluntary membership; all its members should be its user-
owners; a cooperative should be democratically managed by those who derive their authority from 
members and are fully accountable to their members. But in fact none of these conditions in reality 
(Saxena, no date).   20
The further problem in a largely illiterate village in a low-income country is how 
the poor will muster up the courage to seek out information – assuming that a Right to 
Information was recognised in law.
20 The biggest fear of the village level functionary is 
the possibility that one day the ordinary person in the village will be given the right to ask 
questions and demand information on how the money for government programmes has 
been spent (Roy, 1999). Deep democratic decentralisation coupled with the actual use of 
the right to information would be the best mechanism for ensuring accountability of 
government functionaries.  In other words, it is not just that government programmes for 
basic services (health, education, water and sanitation) and poverty alleviation have to be 
delivered through directly and democratically-elected village and local councils.  To 
ensure the accountability of local functionaries, the community needs to have access to 
all relevant documents pertaining to those projects and programmes.  Box 2 shows the 
kind of transparency that is expected of local councils in India after the creation of PRI 
system. 
 
Box 2.  India:  Demanding Accountability from Village Councils 
 
‘Each state should consider passing orders highlighting three different aspects of 
transparency. First, the panchayati raj institution (PRI), especially the gram 
panchayat, should display all vital information pertaining to development projects, 
especially receipt of funds and how they are being spent, in the panchayat offices or 
on a prominent board outside the school, for the information of the public. Second, 
all relevant records should be open to inspection, and third, members should also be 
able to obtain photocopies of documents pertaining to the development projects as 
also matters of general public interest by paying a nominal charge. Particularly, all 
bills, muster rolls, vouchers, estimates and measurement books, also the criterion 
and procedure for selection of beneficiaries, and list of beneficiaries should not only 
be available for inspection, but photocopies of these documents should be given on 
demand.’ 
 
Source: N.C. Saxena, Secretary Rural Development, Government of India, in a letter to all Chief 
Secretaries in state governments, 4
th July 1997.  
 
 
 
4. Democratic Decentralisation is spreading 
 
There is a strong correlation between per capita income and the share of local 
government in total government expenditure and revenue (Somanathan, 2001). This 
suggests that richer countries have been generally more successful in devolving power to 
local governments. It could be that this happens because the demand for government 
services rises more than proportionately with income. In any case, this is consistent with 
                                                           
20 Thus in Kerala, not only has the state decided to allocate 40 per cent of plan funds for the village 
councils, the right to information has been added to the panchayat raj legislation. However, as Goetz and 
Jenkins (1999) rightly note, if there is limited uptake of the provision in literate and politically conscious 
Keralans, this is unlikely to work anywhere else.   21
our argument that the accountability of politicians is increased if the electorate can punish 
or reward performance separately for local and national/state levels. 
 
The good news is that democratic decentralisation is growing in many parts of the 
developing world. In Latin America, with the exception of a few small countries, 
virtually all legislative and executive authorities are now elected in 13 000 units of local 
government. Through much of Latin America popular and indigenous organisations, 
often based on traditional forms of association, give voice to the poor and deal with 
immediate needs in health, education, and public infrastructure. In the Philippines, 
Bolivia and Brazil decentralisation laws require local governments to incorporate 
grassroots organisations in their deliberations and to give such organisations a role in 
administering services and projects (Manor, 1999). Participatory budgetmaking in Porto 
Alegre, Brazil, demonstrates that having local communities make decisions on the use of 
municipal resources can be very effective in local development (World Bank, 1996). New 
government forums can increase the voice of marginalized groups especially if ethnic 
minorities are geographically located in one area.  For instance, as a result of the Popular 
Participation law in Bolivia municipal councils were created where Quechua and Aymara 
representatives can contribute to decisions on allocating resources (Garau, 2001).   
Community participation is occurring in planning (e.g. Rebuilding and Development 
Programmes in Cape Town), water production (e.g. Haiti and Yaounde), and 
environmental issues (e.g. implementation of Local Action Agenda 21 programmes in 
Uganda and Bolivia).    
 
Decentralisation is spreading in developed countries as well. There is 
regionalisation occurring in Europe (Somanathan, 2001; Garau, 2001). In the UK there 
has been a devolution to Scotland and Wales and creation of regional development 
agencies in England. Greater powers will be devolved to regions in Italy after a 
referendum on whether or not gives greater powers to the regional governments in 2001. 
Spain too has experienced similar trends. 
  
In urban governance there have been efforts at government reforms at the 
metropolitan level. Garau (2001) suggests that the reasons for these reforms have 
changed since the 1970s. There is still the logic of functionalism; in other words, the 
metropolis is still regarded as an important functional territory for infrastructure building 
and the provision of urban services. But there are additional rationales now: the need to 
implement policies to protect the environment; foster social inclusion; and strengthen the 
fight against violence. Strong local government units have been created e.g. the new 
Greater London Authority, the Verband Regio Stuttgart, and Metro Toronto; and 
somewhat less powerful structures in metropolises of South Africa. 
 
 In the last decade there has been a massive shift in development thinking in 
favour of decentralisation of government. The World Bank, as part of its public sector 
reforms, as also of its neo-liberal bias against the state, particularly tried to encourage 
decentralisation of service delivery through much of the late 1980s and1990s. However, 
as one could have known from the beginning, decentralisation would work if it helped to 
neutralise the power of the local elite in the decision-making process. If it merely   22
substitutes the power of the national elite by the power of a local elite, decentralisation 
cannot give voice to the people. Elementary facts such as these have taken long to 
penetrate in large technocracies like the World Bank. However, that such ideas have had 
their influence is clearly suggested by the World Development Report 2000/1 (‘Attacking 
Poverty’), presaged as it was by participatory poverty assessments in dozens of countries: 
‘To benefit poor people, it [decentralisation] must have adequate support and safeguards 
from the centre and effective mechanisms of participation’ (p.106). Clearly, in some 
ways the form that decentralisation has taken in a state like MP is reform in the right 
direction, but does not in fact go far enough.
21 
 
An argument often made is that the poor are not prepared for democracy, and that 
building democratic institutions takes time. For instance, the World Development Report 
2001 states: ‘Civil and political liberties, along with competitive elections, are powerful 
instruments for holding governments accountable for their actions. To translate this 
potential into reality, many institutions need to be in place to ensure that democratic 
processes function as they should – among them, independent media to monitor electoral 
and administrative processes, an independent judiciary to uphold the constitution and rule 
of law, and strong parliamentary institutions with the capacity to monitor the executive 
through such mechanisms as public accounts committees. Building these institutions 
takes time…’ (p.113) (emphasis added). But does it really?  
 
Indeed, it does take time for institutions to take root and acquire a life of their 
own, independent of their creators. However, institutions can exist for a long time, and 
yet not act in the interests of the poor – as for instance, the judiciary in many Latin 
American countries has often acted in the interest of authoritarian regimes that appoint 
the judges. Or for that matter, in state level legislatures in the larger, federal South Asian 
countries, where land is a provincial subject, state governments have habitually prevented 
land reforms from being enacted – except in West Bengal or Kerala (where the 
Communist Party of India was in power). Clearly, where the political commitment exists, 
the priorities of the poor are tackled first. Where the democratic framework already exists 
at the national (or state) level, democratic decentralisation at the lowest level should take 
priority. It is at the lowest level of government that the incentives for participation work 
best, and when participation and voice is strong, and the government responsive, basic 
service delivery is likely to be effective.  The evidence in the preceding section shows 
that in all the cases discussed deep democratic decentralisation has shown results in less 
than a decade. 
 
What role might non-governmental organisations have in such democratic 
decentralisation? NGOs can indeed help to mobilise and empower communities – where 
they exist. More often than not, the coverage of NGOs is rarely broad enough to make a 
difference. The evidence from over 60 participatory poverty assessments is that NGOs 
are few and far between (Narayan et al, 2000). Many of them are engaged in innovative 
activities – but on a small scale. Scaling up those innovative, pro-poor activities to a 
national or state level can only be the job of governments. For example, there are some 
                                                           
21 The MP government has already moved further than the measures analysed in this paper. Gram swaraj or 
direct democracy will become a reality in the year 2001 (Manor, 2001; .., 2001).   23
NGOs engaged in extremely useful, innovative activities in elementary education in 
several parts of India. Unfortunately, it requires the financial muscle and institutional 
infrastructure of the state to take those activities to scale. 
 
 
5. History is in our favour 
 
History is in favour of democracy and  decentralisation. Thus Lindert (2000) 
argues that before the 20
th century there is so little social spending of any kind (i.e. tax-
based public spending on health care, low-income housing subsidies, education, pensions, 
welfare and unemployment compensation) mainly because political voice is so restricted. 
Voting rights were restricted by law limiting the franchise to those who owned some 
land, earned some minimum income, or paid some minimum value of direct taxes. It has 
been argued that the social spending share of the economy was restricted in 1780-1880 in 
OECD countries; rose much over the 1880-1980 century, especially after World War II; 
and its share has remained roughly constant in the industrialised countries since 1980. As 
voting rights became less restricted, a shift occurred towards progressive taxation, 
enabling social spending to grow.  
 
In fact, the interests of those with voice explains why Prussia and laissez-faire 
North America pioneered the public schools financed from taxes and why Britain fell 
behind (despite the latter being regarded as the workshop of the world). Lindert (2000) 
suggests two reasons – which derive from the political economy of these regions. First, 
there was a systematic influence of the spread of voting rights upon primary schools 
enrolments (as on social transfer spending as a share of GDP). Countries where a 
majority of adults (North America, Australia, France) voted had many more children in 
school than either non-democracies or countries where only a wealthy minority could 
vote (e.g. Britain, US South). Nearly universal white male voting rights in the US and 
Canada set the stage for local tax-based funding of a largely public school system, and 
similarly in Australia and New Zealand.  Britain was an educational laggard mainly 
because electoral reform was slower in Britain and because Parliament kept central 
control of school finance.  After the Third Reform Act (1884/85) the vote was extended 
from 31 per cent (Second Reform Act, 1867/68) to about 63 per cent of the U.K.  Until 
then  the reliance on central government and private sources for school funding delayed 
the expansion of schooling.  France was a laggard until mid-19
th century.  The 1848 
Revolution gave voting rights for all men, but the Emperor was ambivalent on the 
education front for two decades thereafter. 
 
A second cause of the spread of schooling was decentralisation. Prussia/Germany 
and Northern America (Canada, Northern USA) left the decision of how much tax to pay 
for schools up to the localities. Even though the German national government was 
undemocratic, local governments raised the taxes and locally elected and appointed 
officials ran the schools. This was unlike the case in Britain, and other industrialising 
countries, where education lagged behind.  The British Parliament had created barriers to 
local government initiative by requiring a locality to get a Parliament loaded in favour of 
church and landed interests to approve new local taxes for schools.  Scotland, which was   24
permitted to depend more on local taxation, did much better than England in school 
enrolments (Lindert, 2001).  In France commitment to education suddenly increased after 
the defeat at Prussian hands in 1870.  What also helped was the law of 1867, which 
forced communes to raise more local taxes if they wished, and mandated more local 
schools for girls.  The communes responded by raising their local revenues. 
 
There are some implications for prospects for social spending and access to basic 
services in developing countries from this historical experience. The transfer of power 
from metropolitan countries to post-colonial governments in Asia and much of Sub-
Saharan Africa was accompanied by universal suffrage. Nationalist parties, which had led 
the anti-colonial movement, naturally were the first to come to power. However, 
democracy was quickly subverted in many of them, superseded by one-party dominant 
states. Only in the late 1980s and 1990s some semblance of democracy was restored in 
several of the African states. Unfortunately, the emergence of democracy had been 
preceded by an effective collapse of the state, hand in hand with a collapse of output, 
incomes and public spending through the 1980s. Similarly, there have been few Latin 
American countries with democracies in the last half-century, though 
military/authoritarian governments have given way in the 1980s and 1990s to 
democratically elected regimes. Yet, the sharp decline in output and incomes in the 
1980s, and the growing income inequality and poverty incidence in much of Latin 
America even in the 1990s have further stratified these societies.
22 Politically, while 
national governments might be democratically elected, policies are populist and methods 
of implementation are authoritarian; deep democratic decentralisation is now the way 
forward.  
 
Concluding remarks 
 
We began with Sen’s three arguments in favour of democratic political freedoms 
and civil rights: their direct importance for basic capabilities, including that of political 
and social participation; their instrumental role in enhancing the hearing the people get, 
including their claim to economic needs; and their constructive role in the 
conceptualisation of the needs. We have suggested that most democratic developing 
states offer the possibility of the first, but in fact it does not translate into effective voice 
in decision-making on issues affecting the daily lives of the poor. The once-in-five year 
exercised right to vote is not participation.
23 Given that the vast majority of the poor in 
most low-income countries are illiterate and for all practical purposes voiceless
24, and 
their access to the ‘free’ media is limited, democracy also does not play the instrumental 
                                                           
22 For evidence on worsening distribution of income in Latin America, see ECLAC (2000), and Cornia 
(2000). 
23 Soviet citizens had that right to vote too – that could not be defined as the complex functioning of 
participation. Even more importantly, Soviet citizens had realised the simple functionings in the absence of 
the complex functioning of participation. In authoritarian but centrally planned states that was possible; in 
democratic capitalist countries that is unlikely. 
24 A billion people in the world are illiterate, and if we accept the $1 a day poverty-line, 1.2 billion are poor 
– suggesting that there is considerable overlap between the illiterate and the poor.   25
role of ensuring hearing of their needs.
25 The conceptualisation of their needs is more 
often carried out by well-intentioned, well-educated bureaucrats, neither fully sharing nor 
understanding the life experiences of the poor, functioning through vertically-operated 
sectoral line ministries. Thus, while national democracy offers much potential or scope 
for articulating the needs of the poor for basic social services, in such an environment the 
potential for the poor to acquire simple functionings is rarely realised except in a highly 
distorted manner. Deep democratic decentralisation creates the basis for participation, the 
collective voicing of needs and collective action to force the government to deliver 
services effectively. 
                                                           
25 If anything, the media is dominated usually by an urban elite, who rarely write about or raise 
development issues, and are often more driven by concerns of national security, law and order, sports, and 
international news. See Dreze (1999) for an excellent analysis of the media and its neglect of development 
(including education) issues in India.   26
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